Filed under: Development, Security
I remember years ago when we talked about cookie poisoning, the act of modifying cookies to get the application to act differently. An example was the classic cookie used to indicate a user’s role in the system. Often times it would contain 1 for Admin or 2 for Manager, etc. Change the cookie value and all of a sudden you were the new admin on the block. You really don’t hear the phrase cookie poisoning anymore, I guess it was too dark.
There are still security risks around the cookies that we use in our application. I want to highlight 2 key attributes that help protect the cookies for your .Net application: Secure and httpOnly.
The secure flag tells the browser that the cookie should only be sent to the server if the connection is using the HTTPS protocol. Ultimately this is indicating that the cookie must be sent over an encrypted channel, rather than over HTTP which is plain text.
Setting The Attributes
There are multiple ways to set these attributes of a cookie. Things get a little confusing when talking about session cookies or the forms authentication cookie, but I will cover that as I go. The easiest way to set these flags for all developer created cookies is through the web.config file. The following snippet shows the httpCookies element in the web.config.
<system.web> <authentication mode="None" /> <compilation targetframework="4.6" debug="true" /> <httpruntime targetframework="4.6" /> <httpcookies httponlycookies="true" requiressl="true" /> </system.web>
As you can see, you can set httponlycookies to true to se the httpOnly flag on all of the cookies. In addition, the requiressl setting sets the secure flag on all of the cookies with a few exceptions.
I stated earlier there are a few exceptions to the cookie configuration. The first I will discuss is the session cookie. The session cookie in ASP.Net is defaulted/hard-coded to set the httpOnly attribute. This should override any value set in the httpCookies element in the web.config. The session cookie does not default to requireSSL and setting that value in the httpCookies element as shown above should work just find for it.
The forms authentication cookie is another exception to the rules. Like the session cookie, it is hard-coded to httpOnly. The Forms element of the web.config has a requireSSL attribute that will override what is found in the httpCookies element. Simply put, if you don’t set requiressl=”true” in the Forms element then the cookie will not have the secure flag even if requiressl=”true” in the httpCookies element.
This is actually a good thing, even though it might not seem so yet. Here is the next thing about that Forms requireSSL setting.. When you set it, it will require that the web server is using a secure connection. Seems like common sense, but… imagine a web farm where the load balancers offload SSL. In this case, while your web app uses HTTPS from client to server, in reality, the HTTPS stops at the load balancer and is then HTTP to the web server. This will throw an exception in your application.
I am not sure why Microsoft decided to make the decision to actually check this value, since the secure flag is a direction for the browser not the server. If you are in this situation you can still set the secure flag, you just need to do it a little differently. One option is to use your load balancer to set the flag when it sends any responses. Not all devices may support this so check with your vendor. The other option is to programmatically set the flag right before the response is sent to the user. The basic process is to find the cookie and just sent the .Secure property to “True”.
While there are other security concerns around cookies, I see the secure and httpOnly flag commonly misconfigured. While it does not seem like much, these flags go a long way to helping protect your application. ASP.Net has done some tricky configuration of how this works depending on the cookie, so hopefully this helps sort some of it out. If you have questions, please don’t hesitate to contact me. I will be putting together something a little more formal to hopefully clear this up a bit more in the near future.
Filed under: Development, Security, Testing
The .Net Web Development and Tools Blog just recently posted some extra information about ASP.Net December 2013 Security Updates (http://blogs.msdn.com/b/webdev/archive/2013/12/10/asp-net-december-2013-security-updates.aspx).
The most interesting thing to me was a note near the bottom of the page that states that the next version of ASP.Net will FORBID setting ViewStateMac=false. That is right.. They will not allow it in the next version. So in short, if you have set it to false, start working out how to work it to true before you update.
So why forbid it? Apparently, there was a Remote Code Execution flaw identified that can be exploited when ViewStateMac is disabled. They don’t include a lot of details as to how to perform said exploit, but that is neither here nor there. It is about time that something was critical enough that they have decided to take this property out of the developer’s hands.
Over the years I have written many posts discussing attacking ASP.Net sites, many of which rely on ViewStateMac being disabled. I have written to Microsoft regarding how EventValidation can be manipulated if ViewStateMac is disabled. The response was that they think developers should be using the secure settings. I guess that is different now that there is remote code execution. We have reached a new level.
So what does ViewStateMac protect? There are three things that I am aware of that it protects (search this site for any of these and you will find articles with much more detail):
- ViewState – protects this from parameter tampering
- EventValidation – protects this from parameter tampering
- ViewStateUserKey – Used to protect requests from CSRF
So why do developers disable ViewStateMac? Great question. I believe that in most cases, it is disabled because the application is deployed in a web farm and when the web.config is not configured properly, an error is thrown. When some developers search for the error, many forums recommend disabling the ViewStateMac to fix the problem. Unfortunately, that is WRONG!!. Here is a Microsoft KB article that explains in detail how to properly configure a system to allow ViewStateMac to be enabled (http://support.microsoft.com/kb/2915218).
Is this a good thing? For developers, yes!. This will definitely help increase the protection for ViewState, EventValidation and CSRF if ViewStateUserKey is set. For Penetration Testers, Yes/No. Yes, because we get to say you are doing a good job in this category. No, because some easy pickings are going to be wiped off the plate.
I think this is a pretty bold move by Microsoft to remove control over this, but I do think it is a good thing. This is an important control in the WebForm ecosystem and all too often mis-understood by developers. This should bring many sites one step closer to being a little more secure when this change rolls out.