SameSite By Default in 2020?
Filed under: Development, Security, Testing
If you haven’t seen, Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is getting a big protection by default in 2020. Currently, most protections need to be implemented explicitly. While we are seeing some nonces included and checked by default (Razor Pages), you typically still need to explicitly check the nonce. This requires that the developers understand that CSRF is a risk and how to prevent it. They then need to implement a mitigating solution.
Background
CSRF has been around for a long time. For those that don’t know, it is a vulnerability that allows an attacker to forge requests to your application that the user doesn’t initiate. Imagine being able to get a user to transfer money using a request like https://yourbank.com/transfer/300. They place this request on another site in an image tag. When the image attempts to load, it sends the request to the other bank site. Assuming the bank site uses cookies for authentication and session management, these cookies are sent with the request and the transfer is made (if the user was logged into their bank account).
The most common mitigation was to include a nonce with each request. This made the request to transfer money unique for every user. This is effective, but does require that the developer add the nonce and validate it on the request. A few years back, the browsers started adding support for the samesite attribute. This has the advantage of being set on the cookies instead of every request. The idea behind samesite is that a cookie will not be sent if the requesting domain is different than the destination domain. In our example above, if mybank.com has an image tag set to yourbank.com, the browser will not send the cookies for yourbank.com with the request.
Today
Fortunately, we are at a time when most browsers have support for samesite, but it does require that the developer set the appropriate setting. Like implementing a nonce, this is put on the developer to take an explicit action. The adoption of samesite is gaining. Frameworks like .Net Core set this for identity cookies to lax by default.
2020
Chrome has announced that in 2020, Chrome 80 will set the samesite flag to lax for all cookies by default. (https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/developers-get-ready-for-new.html) This is good news, as it will help take a huge dent out of cross-site request forgery. Of course, that only means if you are using Chrome as a browser. I am sure that Mozilla and Microsoft will follow suit, but there is no mention of a timeline to when that will happen. So is CSRF dead, no. It has taken a strong blow though.
But wait, it is just set to lax.. what does that mean? There are two settings for samesite: strict and lax. Lax, as its name implies is a little more forgiving. For the most part, it is good enough coverage if you follow your basic guidelines (Don’t use GET for making changes to your system). However, if you do use GET requests, you still have a risk. Remember that example earlier https://yourbank.com/transfer/300? This is using a GET request. with Lax, an attacker can put that link in a link tag on their site, rather than an image tag. Now, if the user clicks the link, it will open it as the top level request and will still send the cookies. This is that difference between strict and lax. Strict would not allow the cookies to be sent in this scenario.
What does this mean?
At this point, this change means you should be checking your current applications to see if you have any type of cross-site requests that need to send cookies to work. If these exist, you will need to take action to turn samesite off or make other accommodations. If you find that samesite will be a problem for your setup, you can turn it off by setting samesite: none. This does require that the cookie is set to secure.
If your application doesn’t use cross-site requests, you still should take action. Remember, this only defaults in Chrome. So if your users are using anything else, this change doesn’t effect them yet. They will still be vulnerable if you are not implementing other CSRF mitigations.
Making the Change in FireFox Now
FireFox does have the ability to enable this behavior in the about:config. Starting in FireFox 69, you can modify the following preferences:
- network.cookie.sameSite.laxByDefault
- network.cookie.sameSite.noneRequiresSecure
These are both set to false by default, but a user can change them to true. Note that this is a user setting and not one that you can force your users to set. It is still recommended to set the samesite attribute through your application.
Making the Change in Chrome Now
Chrome has the ability to enable this behavior in chrome://flags. There are two settings:
- SameSite by default cookies
- Cookies without SameSite must be secure
These are currently both set false by default, but you can change them too true.
Be Careful
As a user, making these changes can add a layer of protection, but it can also break some sites you may use. Be careful when enabling these since it may render some sites unreliable.
Microsoft Introduces Quick Security References
Filed under: Security
Yesterday, Microsoft released two new Quick Security References (QSR’s) to help application development teams understand Security issues. These new guides are the first part of a continuing series to help multiple roles within the team understand common vulnerabilities. Not only do they provide great detail on the security issues, but they also help teams move toward SDL adoption.
The first two QSR’s focus on Cross Site Scripting and SQL Injection. I think it is good that they started with these two vulnerabilities because they are the two most common types of attacks. These two vulnerabilities take turns in the first and second position on the OWASP Top 10. I encourage anyone and everyone involved with applications, from the business personnel to the technical teams, to read over these guides. They are about 20 pages in length, but provide a really good description of the attacks.
The QSR’s can be downloaded from Microsoft here: http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyID=79042476-951f-48d0-8ebb-89f26cf8979d&displayLang=en
Follow Us
